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I am truly humbled by this honour and generally feel quite unworthy. I say this not as polite rhetoric but, as I will try to explain, because I have not been able to demonstrate in any consistent way a record in which my research has significantly helped those who have been forcibly displaced. The problem is that I believe it should, My standard is that scholarship has an ethical imperative that drives it. The pursuit of truth is – according to my beliefs – for the benefit of humanity. Yet in the tension between service to humanity and being a slave to truth, I have consistently chosen Athena, the Goddess of Wisdom – and also the Goddess of War - as my mistress and eschewed Quan Yin, the Goddess of Mercy and Compassion. Yahweh is a schizophrenic God, with one side committed to Justice and the strict lessons of truth while Abraham as my forefather appealed to God the merciful to leaven his strictures on pure principles of justice with compassion for the weaknesses of humanity and the few who exemplify the traits of virtue. Though I have sometimes strayed – most noticeably in the private sponsorship campaign to help the Indochinese refugees that led to the creation of the centre for Refugee Studies – my choices mostly went to serving the pursuit of knowledge even when it was at the cost or risk of undermining assistance for refugees.   

What about research in general? Does research on refugees help refugees? Clearly some research does help bring about significant change. I recall that when I arrived in this university in 1966, in the first few years of our Atkinson Council meetings, I would make a motion at the beginning of each academic year to ban smoking at meetings of the Atkinson Council. In those days when it was not publicly known that cigarette smoking was a leading cause of cancer, each year the motion was defeated by a ratio of 2:1 in spite of my brilliant philosophical arguments concerning rights of non-smokers to a smoke-free environment that assaulted my senses and that created smelly and distasteful environment. Nietzschian aesthetic arguments failed to convince my colleagues. In those early days of York, once again at the beginning of an academic year, I again tabled the same motion. I was surprised when a new appointee in Biology, John Heddle, a geneticist who subsequently became well known in his field​[1]​, seconded my motion. Though I had been involved in his hiring, I did not really know John and had not asked him to second the motion, but was delighted he did so. I gave my usual ethical, aesthetic and political theoretical arguments in support of a ban. Then John asked to speak to the motion. He described his research that demonstrated that cigarette smoke was not only a carcinogen, but a mutagen. In addition to mutating the genes of the smoker, a passive individual in the same averaged sized room as the smoker inhaled about 10% of the smoke. Further, exhaled smoke contained the highest concentration of carcinogenic and mutagenic substances so the passive individual received the worst smoke. The vote was held. All but one member of the Atkinson Council voted to ban smoking from Council meetings. 





When we speak of research on refugees we do not simply mean treating refugees like a cadaver or a medical patient to be probed and examined. In fact, the majority of the research on refugees is not on refugees themselves, on why they decide to flee or what they experience. Some of it is on those who force them to flee, that is, on the perpetrators. Most of that research falls under the rubric of conflict research, for most refugees try to escape violence as the classic 1989 work by Ari Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo (1989), Escape from Violence, demonstrated. 

However some of the research on refugees is about perpetrators who are persecutors and usually falls under the topic of human rights research, for a small minority of refugees are actually Convention Refugees, that is refugees, as defined under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’​[2]​ As former citizens or stateless persons, these refugees have already escaped the persecution and simply do not want to return to be persecuted anymore. But, as most of us know, not all those who have escaped persecution are refugees, for they had to be members of certain groups who were persecuted. If they were persecuted because they were women, should they be classified as refugees? If they were persecuted because of their sexual orientation, should they be classified as refugees? 

And why should refugee research be confined to those who managed to cross the border of a state? What about the internally displaced? And why restrict the research to those just fleeing persecution and violence? So much, though perhaps not enough, of refugee research is not on refugees per se but on internally displaced persons or IDPs. Since some of those forcibly displaced flee natural disasters – those who survived the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami were called refugees even though they neither crossed a border nor were victims of man-made violence or persecution. More are expected from climate change.​[3]​ Others are forcibly displaced because of development projects or, in the case of the New Orleans flood, because governments failed to undertake adequate protective measures to protect its own citizens from predictable natural disasters. 
  
	So much of refugee research is not about victims or perpetrators but is a philosophical question attacked by historians, legal scholars, sociologists, economists, anthropologists and political scientists who make incursions onto philosophical turf and ask about definitions – who is and who should be defined as a refugee? Though I certainly have inquired about the historical origins of the conception and its various meanings, I have been happy to treat the term as an equivocal one with many definitions belonging to the same family and have been content to explore various interpretations without insisting on a univocal one. I have graciously ceded the investigative turf of prescriptive definitions to would be ersatz philosophers.

	However, most of my own research has been neither on refugees nor on perpetrators or persecutors, but on the bystanders who may or may not respond to the plight of refugees. My concern has mostly been to explore who helps, why they help, why they fail to help and the all important ethical question, why and how they should and could help. So right from the start I have to confess that I have no intention of answering the question, ‘Does research on refugees help refugees?’ contrary to the impression of my early abstract. Rather, I will rephrase the question and ask, ‘Has my research on refugees helped refugees?’ having already confessed that almost all of the research has not even been on refugees or the perpetrators of their condition, but on those expected, asked or needing to respond. 

	So if you came expecting an answer to the general question, I cannot offer you your money back because this is a free lecture. In fact, I can only offer you further disappointment. For in redefining the question on whether my research on bystanders to the plight of refugees helps refugees, the question turns out to be a concern with neither refugees, however broadly defined, victimizers or helpers, potential or actual, but about research itself. And it is a specific question about that research – does it have an impact? It is not about whether the research led to publications or even whether anyone read what was published. The question is whether the research led to any change and, if it did, did those changes benefit the refugees?





	Let me quickly shift from the interrogative to the assertive mode. My research has been characterized by a number of features. It has been interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary borrowing from history, anthropology, sociology, economics, political science and a number of times even from psychology. I have first and foremost defined myself as a research scholar rather than a member of a single discipline confined to a specific topic. And like refugees, my research has paid little attention to boundaries, especially disciplinary ones, but even boundaries defining a problem. Research on the hermeneutics of the section on lordship and bondage in Hegel’s Phenomenolgy, I would argue, has given me more insight into the question of refugees than any other research I have undertaken. My research on those who failed to help those who were not even lucky enough to become refugees, on the victims of genocide perpetrated by genocidaires, has also helped me to understand the refugee issue. 

	My research has also been transnational, not surprising for someone who keeps escaping the confines of not only disciplinary boundaries. Ari Zolberg, whom I have already mentioned and who was recently honored at the 2008 International Studies Association for his contribution to ethnic, migration and refugee studies, challenged the whole paradigm that immigration and refugee movements were about leaving one nation for membership in another. Ari always stressed the transnational nature of the phenomenon.​[4]​ I have been in league with Ari. I have also been in league with him in fighting a rearguard and retreating position against the assault of researchers with a cosmopolitan perspective by asserting that although the problem had to be approached from a transnational perspective, the major player remained the state. Unless the policies and positions of the most important players in a specific refugee situation were taken into account, not simply as positions to be attacked by a superego assault, then little could be undertaken to assist refugees. 

	Inter- and multidisciplinary, transnational but state-centric and very wary of cosmopolitan moralism, my research has always eschewed methodological individualism in favor of communitarianism. Refugees were first and foremost members of groups even though, as I have tried to document, the Refugee Convention in its anti-communist moment adopted a strong individualist approach. Instead, I have taken individuals to be born into and constituted by their membership in various collectivities – the family, civil society institutions as members of business and scholarly associations, volunteer agencies, ethnic groups, religions and nations, but most importantly as citizens of a state. We become individuals and rights holders because of such memberships. 

	As Hannah Arendt argued, refugees provide a litmus test for the notion of human rights. The traditional division between statelessness, those outside their country who had no state to which they could return, and refugees, those outside their place of birth but to which they did not want to return because there they would be persecuted, was a distinction without an essential difference. The central issue was the fact that refugees had no rights as long as they were not members of a state. Refugees were a test of the human rights regime because they were a test of the nation-state system of which human rights were derivative. You had NO rights unless you were a member of a polity that provided protection for its citizens.   
      
	Approached from a multi- and interdisciplinary perspective and a transnational but state-centric focus that saw individuals not in a state of nature born with natural rights but as constituted by, though not restricted to, their memberships into which they were born, my research has also been part of the linguistic turn that so marked philosophy in the twentieth century. Because of my work on Hegel, many overlook that my PhD thesis was a work in analytic philosophy and the logic of explanation in history. For example, in a recent essay I published on the headscarf issue in France, as an exemplification of how not to integrate immigrants and refugees, laicité, the term used to characterize the French secular religion, is translated as secular, but any acquaintance with the French teaches us that the anti-religious religion of laicité does not quite ‘cut the mustard’ when laicité is translated as ‘secular’. Secular is indifferent to religion. It is agnostic. By contrast, laicité is passionate anti-clericalism.  Thus, the most important instrument with which we grasp the world intellectually – language - is fraught with problems and gaps and misunderstandings. Yet language is also the primary instrument through which we question that understanding of the world and even language as the basis for that understanding. Inherently, then, in learning, in a life as learning, we learn that life must be a continuous learning experience. If language is that with which we grasp the world and by which we are in its grasp, then the very tool that is the source of our intellectual understanding is also the source of our misunderstandings. 

	Who knows this better than immigrants and refugees? Immigrants and refugees often must learn a language in order to integrate into a society, but also as outsiders they learn the language to question and interrogate its assumptions and see the society from an angular vision. They also learn that language is not only about speech and written words but about body language and any system of sending messages from one person to another. Thus, immigration and refugee research is inherently a continuous process of questioning including the assumption that immigration is a one-way street in which an unchanging society took in and assimilated newcomers. The reality is that newcomers really changed the society in which they arrived possibly even more than they were changed by that society. Furthermore, continuous learning as the paradigmatic immigrant and refugee experience, teaches all of us, but particularly researchers, that we are all immigrants and refugees in an alien landscape. As researchers, we are refugees from conceptions that trap and restrict us.
 
	So my life as a multi- and interdisciplinary researcher with a transnational yet state-centric communitarian approach has been a life of an intellectual refugee. But an intellectual refugee who is a philosopher! As a philosopher, my primary focus has been international ethics. International ethics is not cosmopolitan moralism telling everyone how they ought to treat the downtrodden and particularly refugees. Rather it is an inquiry into our everyday practices and the norms that underpin them. This does not mean that it is a passive inquiry. Just as Abraham could argue with God over the mass atrocities God intended to inflict on Sodom and Gomorrah, international ethics is astutely critical. But it is an inquiry that begins with practices that already provide a normative framework. The question is not, ‘how ought we to behave?’ as Immanuel Kant insisted, but what are the existing norms that tell us how we ought to behave and what are the strengths, weakness, shortcomings and contradictions in those norms? 

	Because the research is so concerned with inherited contradictions, it is inherently dialectical. And it is self-critical. For years - since I began my research on refugees - I had written that no peace agreement could proceed without taking into account the plight of the refugees. The success of a peace agreement was dependent on taking the situation of the refugees into account. Yet when I was part of a 32-person research team led by Steve Stedman, Don Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens on what are the characteristics that ensure peace agreements are kept and sustained – 85% simply lead to more war – my research focused on refugees. The study of sixteen cases showed without exception that the terms of the peace agreement and keeping that agreement did not depend on resolving or even dealing with the refugee issue. My previous writing and the assumptions I had made were simply wrong. Why had I been wrong? Why had I made an assumption that proved so contradictory to the facts?

	Exploring the reasons for contrary results is as important as the contrary results themselves. Behind the assumption was what I wanted to be the case, not what was the case. Suffering from the mindlblindness of an unquestioned assumption, I had been previously unable to learn not simply some heuristic techniques to assist in including refugees in future peace agreements, but the reasons for their exclusion and the importance of the whole phenomenon of recognition to what help could or could not be extended to refugees. The issue of identity was fundamental. I had found my way back to my philosophical roots.

	Though my research was inter- and multidisciplinary, transnational in scope and state-centred in focus, with a holistic approach driven by an ethical rather than a moralist agenda that began with actual practices rather than absolute categorical imperatives, and propelled forward by the discovery of contradictions towards a recognition that issues of recognition and identity were at the core of most refugee problems, where was there any measure of utility? The research was impelled by normative concerns with effectiveness in at least two senses. The research had begun with my active involvement in the movement to promote private sponsorship of the Indochinese Boat people in 1979. Research did not lead to activism. Rather, the activism provided me with a body of knowledge that asked that I undertake some research on it. If anything, the research led me away from the time and effort I could have devoted to helping other refugees. Did the research have any feedback and benefit the refugees?

The Utility and Impact of Research
	
	If activism provided the material for the research and thus motivated it in part, the other side of the equation is that research led back to the query of whether that research had any added value. Behind my research was a normative premise that knowledge ought to help. But I had been wrong in assuming that solving the refugee problem was important to keeping peace agreements. Was I now incorrect in assuming that research was important to assisting refugees? Perhaps this had merely been a self-serving premise to rationalize my preference for research rather than actually assisting refugees? After all, how could research help refugees? I was well aware that some actual research practices did not improve the lot of refugees. Most of us who have undertaken research in refugee camps are well aware of the widespread resentment of refugees being probed and queried but without any significant changes in their status or conditions. Their hope helps them to suppress those resentments and cooperate once again with a new lot of intellectual voyeurs who, to some extent, take advantage of the entrapment of the refugees to provide the researchers with empirical material.   

	If one believes that knowledge ought to help refugees, we not only have the problem of figuring out how knowledge can be translated into change, and change that produces a measurable improvement, but how to measure or even define that improvement. Is the function of the research intended to help redress an imbalance and allow knowledge to speak to power which is too indifferent to the powerlessness of others? Or from a very different tack, is the knowledge intended to speak to need rather than power so that the focus is not so much on empowering the refugees but on ensuring that those who have the power truly serve the needs of the refugees? Is it possible to pursue both goals at the same time, or do they tend to be mutually exclusive?

	If these are just a few of the questions raised by attending to the goals of the research, how is one to deal with the problem of measurement? We can ask for weak measure and insist that refugees should be at least not left worse off after research than before with the hope that the research might gradually improve their lot. Or we can ask for a strong measure that insists that research should make their situation positively better. We can also query issues of scale. For some research attacks very specific problems while other research goes to the heart of the very condition of refugees and the institutions that have been evolved to address refugee problems. 

	Further, in addition to the problem of scale and significance of research that varies from the small scale to the whole sphere of the field, there is also the fact that some of that research is hardly research but merely matters of sophisticated journalism as when I traveled to Sri Lanka in the early eighties. By means that I will not go into in this speech, I managed to get into the north, and reported on the situation. demonstrating that the refugees from Sri Lanka were not merely products of discrimination and the riots in Colombo, but were forced to flee because of a full scale war in the north of the country in which the Sri Lankan army was accused of mistreating civilians, a charge that could not be proven previously since western observers had been excluded from the north of Sri Lanka​[5]​. That research led to immediate changes in Canadian refugee policy so that Canada stopped automatically rejecting refugee claimants from the north of Sri Lanka. 

	On the other hand, research that was just a notch above the quasi-journalism of the Sri Lankan research - when we documented the number of Palestinian refugees made homeless by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and demonstrated that objective numbers could be obtained even in the midst of war and a crisis - did result in the York figures being used by all sides in the conflict as an objective piece of information​[6]​. However, the results did not lead to setting up an independent international compiler of statistics on deaths and displaced in disaster situations – a sort of Independent International Audit Bureau of Numbers, though some NGOs and researchers have stepped in to offer results on conflict epidemiology that has itself produced as much heat as light on the issue.​[7]​ 

	Nor did that research lead to NGOs adopting controls to ensure they used objective data instead of using figures in a propaganda war. UK OXFAM, an agency dedicated to serving and helping refugees with an excellent record in humanitarian work, never retracted its full page ads claiming – falsely with gross exaggeration – that 600,000 were made homeless by the Israeli invasion. Exaggerated data seems almost as integral to humanitarian work as good deeds. And, as we tried to demonstrate in our study of numbers in Zaire after the Rwandan genocide, sometimes those misleading original figures and subsequent false and exaggerated numbers have enormous and negative political implications​[8]​. My impression – though I have not followed up with further research – is that our research on objectivity of the most fundamental order – on numbers – has not led to changes in the practice of using numbers for propaganda purposes in current crises. Witness the reporting on Darfur! However, it is noticeable that in the case of Palestinian refugee scholarship, an objective figure of approximately of just over 700,000 in now used by Palestinian, Israeli and other scholars as the appropriate figure rather than the original figure of 925,000 registered refugees originally disseminated by UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees​[9]​, or the just over 500,000 figure that Israelis claimed were displaced​[10]​.

	So one might claim a few small victories for objective scholarship, but overall one would have to accept that there had been institutional failure! But does objectivity of a very basic sort help the refugees? After all, part of the reason for the exaggeration was not a love of hyperbole or an indifference to truth, but a belief that since rations provided by the international community were so skimpy that a 25% exaggeration of numbers might actually lead to more rations overall for the refugees. The imperative to help could be linked with a more elastic approach to data. So if a standard of objectivity had been adopted with measures to check that objectivity, in the short run, refugees might suffer from the results of research.
 
	The issue of research on the most fundamental level of data continues in the crisis in Darfur as I suggested above. When advocates for the terrible plight of the crisis in Darfur easily slip from a figure of 200,000 (and some claim as many as 600,000) who died in the conflict there since 2003 to asserting that at least 200,000 were killed​[11]​, ignoring the fact that most of those who died were not killed in any ordinary meaning of the term, but were victims of disease and sometimes even hunger as a result of the conflict over and above numbers that would have died had the conflict not taken place. And then there is the dilemma that if one queries the terms used, one seems to be undercutting the effort to condemn the Khartoum regime for its horrific response to the rebellion and the use of the janjawid to burn down villages of the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa farmers, and asserting that the problem is not as horrific as agencies are reporting. As I said at the beginning, language is used as a trap as well as a source of revelation. 

	There are not only problems of numbers at the most basic level of research, and of how to classify those numbers, but how to characterize the whole event. The US Congress unanimously passed a resolution in 2004 characterizing the killings and the events in Darfur as genocide​[12]​. A subsequent inquiry initiated by the UN Security Council and conducted by an extremely eminent collection of jurists and experts in genocide came to the opposite conclusion that the gross abuses of human rights and massacres in Darfur were indeed crimes against humanity but initial evidence did not support a claim that genocide was underway.​[13]​ The advocates for the beleagured Darfurian agriculturalists denounced the conclusions as dictated by political motives​[14]​. Eminent and highly respected individuals, such as my close friend Irwin Cotler, a renowned defender of human rights, a former Professor at McGill Law School and a former Minister of Justice, continues to characterize the Darfur crisis as a genocide.​[15]​ 

	Here was a case of both objectivity and of the appropriate use of value-loaded terminology where some scholars believe that genocide as a legal term in its origin should be retained in its original meaning while others prefer a more expansive use of the term and still others who insist that, even in its most restrictive use, the situation in Dafrur qualifies as a genocide. I suspect the debate does not help the over two million refugees and IDPs in Darfur, but in fact muddies the water and is used by the Khartoum regime to cloud its responsibilities for the horrors in Darfur. But what is a scholar dedicated to truth and accuracy to do in such cases? Intellectual responsibilities may be at odds with the imperative to help refugees and the internally displaced.

	The scholarly debates do have effects. They are not ethically neutral. The truth sometimes seems to be at odds with political and humanistic agendas. These disputes effect pedagogy. Recently, the Toronto School Board decided to teach a course on genocide​[16]​ and included in that course the Armenian genocide as a case study. A number of Canadians of Turkish origin denounced the effort as maligning Turkey​[17]​. The Armenians viewed any effort to delete the teaching of the Armenian genocide to high school students as a case of genocide denial. Yet eminent scholars supported the Turks – Lewis, Lewy​[18]​, McCarthy – and insisted it was not a case of genocide. For example, Bernard Lewis, while agreeing that a million were killed and died in the horrific disaster, denied that intent could be historically established​[19]​. Scholars such as McCarthy put forth the “provocation thesis” that the massacres of the Armenians had been provoked by actions of extremist Armenians  that made the excessive response of Turkey understandable without evidence to characterize the response as an intent to exterminate the Armenian population. The scholarly debate over the Armenian genocide then gets conflated with Holocaust denial, not surprising give the extensive efforts documented of the Turkish government to repress Turkish scholars who conclude that genocide in fact occurred​[20]​. 

	So what does a School Board do? They invite some scholars – including myself – to adjudicate the dispute and offer advice. The advice is not too difficult to offer. That which is a matter of legitimate scholarly dispute is not denial. On the other hand, removing the item as an example of genocide would implicitly endorse denial given that the vast majority of scholars in the field agree that what occurred in the case of the Armenians could be characterized as genocide. The reasonable conclusion is probably to teach what occurred as genocide but to bring to the attention of the students the scholarly arguments so that students understand more clearly what is meant by intention and what is required for proof, what is meant by the phrase “in part or in whole”, etc. Thus, scholarly disputes muddy the waters of history and pedagogy let alone the humanitarian work required to help refugees and the internally displaced.
      








1.	Role of religious institutions in refugee sponsorship 
	In my early research on the private sponsorship of the Indochinese refugees​[21]​, I argued that there was a correlation between the experience of a group as or with refugees and their degree of involvement with private sponsorship of refugees. Thus, the Dutch Reformed Church, the Mennonites, and Jewish Reform Synagogues undertook a disproportionate number of sponsorships in comparison to their percentage of the population in Canada. But why Reform Jews and not Orthodox or Conservative Jews? The latter seem much closer to the actual experience of the Holocaust than most Reform Jews? The explanation was that experience alone was insufficient as an explanatory condition.  It had to be reinforced by an ethical imperative characteristic of the teachings of that group. Thus, Reform synagogue emphasis of tikkun olam (mend the world) reinforced the identification with the Holocaust to motivate the sponsorship of refugees. 

	Did that research benefit refugees even if it perhaps throw a bit of, but only a very little, light on the relationship of beliefs and attitudes to private sponsorship? I see no evidence that it did. Though the host program was a byproduct of the success of the refugee sponsorship movement, when I undertook an examination of that program, there was no evidence that the strategy for developing the program took any advantage of this small insight in developing the program, assuming, of course, that this had been a genuine insight. Presumably it might have indicated to the government where it could initially tap into resources, organization and motivation among its civil society constituent members, and the government may have taken advantage of this, but research would need to establish whether there was any benefit for refugees in either private sector initiatives or government strategies. 

2. Role of Government and Media 
	Another piece of very minor research that I undertook at the time of the Indochinese Boat People movement was keeping track of the media reports in relationship to the interviews I gave the media after I observed what happened after the first few interviews. There were well over one hundred interviews that I tracked at the time. In each case, I made a deliberate and emphatic effort to point out that, rather than the government of the time being pressured to increase the intake of Indochinese refugees by the private sponsorship movement, the whole initiative had been a government idea that we just took up and adopted after a little prodding from the government. In detail, I told how what in fact had happened. But the story I told was never once reported. Instead, the tenor of the news stories repeated the theme that the government only upped the intake of Indochinese refugees after being pressured to do so by the private sector. Though the media was invaluable in enhancing support for the private sponsorship movement, my evidence and my subsequent research did make me skeptical of media concerns with accuracy, but I am not sure that if the media had been more accurate and scrapped its dominant trope of a government that only moved in response to pressure from the public, that this would have led to more refugees being sponsored. Quite the reverse! I suspect the dominant trope and the media play on it helped hype private sponsorship. So once again, truth did not seem to empower. Rather, fixation of a predetermined relationship of civil society and the media to the government possibly helped more than the truth. The propensity of the fifth estate to predefine itself as a separate critical estate was connected to what appeared to be a terrific inability to give government credit where credit was due. 
 
3. Private Sponsorship 
	In another piece of research we demonstrated that refugees sponsored by groups of citizens in comparison to those sponsored by the government got jobs more quickly using private sponsorship networks and many years later had far more friends who were not from their ethnic group even though those friends were rarely the private sponsors who helped them get settled. On the downside, privately sponsored refugees tended to spend a shorter time in taking ESL classes and other training to enhance their skills. This research led to the development of the Host Program as a sort of hybrid, A recent 2004 evaluation seemed to support the merits and value of the program in assisting refugees.​[22]​ Mark one up for refugee research. 
				
4. Asylum Rights
	The Indochinese Boat People Movement spurred by private sponsorship dealt with humanitarian refugees rather than refugees applying for asylum under the terms of the Refugee Convention. As I indicated above, that Convention was based on an individual rights perspective that insisted that refugees could not be refouled to a country that they fled where they were at risk. Now in claiming a right to asylum before a quasi-judicial tribunal, Canadian regulation in guiding the interpretation of evidence allowed three possibilities: 
a) the tribunal should insist that the onus of proof that the refugee claimant was a refugee and had been persecuted because of his or her membership in a group rested with the claimant;
b) the tribunal could use as its measure a balance rule – that is, if the balance of evidence favoured the refugee claimant, then the refugee claimant could be granted refugee status; c) the refugee asylum claimant could be given the benefit of the doubt and the onus of disproving the claim rested with the government. Our research indicated that when Canada adopted a benefit of doubt rule rather than a balance of evidence rule, as had other jurisdictions, the likely effect was that Canada admitted 4% more refugee claimants to refugees status than it might have if a balance of evidence rule was used as was the rule in virtually all other jurisdictions. That is, with a balance of evidence rule, we might have admitted 42% of claimants in the year under examination rather than 46%. If the government had determined to follow the crowd rather than bending over backwards to ensure fairness to a refugee claimant, Canada might have taken in approximately 2000 fewer refugee claimants per year on average​[23]​. So research that produced results that could have undermined some refugee claims was ignored in terms of policy so the research ending up as having a neutral effect. The research did not help the refugees; the political commitment did.
			
5. Costs of the Asylum Claims Process




	I have already mention three pieces of overseas research: the research on numbers of those in Lebanon made homeless by the 1982 Israeli invasion​[26]​, the 1983 quasi-journalistic documentation of the Sri Lankan civil war, and the non-relationship of solving the plight of refugees as a prerequisite to keeping signed peace agreements​[27]​. The first research was certainly used by all parties but had no long term impact on norms or practices. The second led to changes in Canadian practices but again without any long term effects on norms. The third does not seem to have had any impact even on scholars. In that study, the concept of “spoilers” as a key factor in the breakdown of peace agreement has become a household term among conflict scholars. However, this negative finding on the role of refugee concerns in maintaining peace agreements has had no discernible impact on either scholars or refugee situations. Rather, numerous references can currently be found on the importance of resolving the refugee problem as a precondition of peace​[28]​. 





	Before I get into the issue of the Palestinian refugees, I might mention my work on the Jewish refugees after WWII and my scholarship that demonstrated a) that it was the plight of the Jewish refugees and what to do with them and not the Holocaust that was critical in the recommendation by the UN to create a Jewish state​[29]​; b) that the so-called “right of return” for the Palestinians was an inadvertent fluke of history though not even included as a right in the original documentation and then only adopted because Jewish extremists murdered Count Folke Bernadotte, the author of the proposition​[30]​; c) that UNRWA had its unique characteristics because it was a remnant of the pre WWII refugee order before UNHCR was created which morphed into the health, education and welfare ministry for Palestinian refugees supported and funded by the international community​[31]​; and d) that UNHCR was not primarily a product of humanitarianism so much as a product of the Cold War and the self-interest of states in Europe in fostering burden sharing​[32]​. Not only has none of this scholarship has, to the best of my knowledge, had any impact on the well-being of refugees, but it has at most a negligible impact on the dominant narratives of the right of return​[33]​, UNRWA​[34]​, UNHCR​[35]​ or the origins of Israel​[36]​. Thus, for example, scholars and journalists continue to assume and write that Israel was created because of guilt over the Holocaust​[37]​ when there is absolutely no evidence to support this claim about guilt as a motivator. A reasonable investigation of UNSCOP, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, does provide evidence that the issue of the Jewish refugees was of special concern.

	On Palestinian refugees, my work on numbers may have had some impact on settling the numbers question, but I believe the most dominant effect by far was the research of Janet Abu Lughod, not because she had a Palestinian last name, but because her demographic expertise contributed to the convincing nature of her results published at the same time as my own​[38]​. As far as solutions for the Palestinian refugees, it was the work of Rashid Khalidi that provided the historical and theoretical basis for distinguishing between the right to return to a home and the right to return to a homeland​[39]​, a distinction that provided the basis for the technical agreement between the Palestinians and the Jewish Israelis in negotiations that I co-chaired in Greece​[40]​ and that constituted the foundation for the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem that would have been a key term in the Oslo Peace Agreement for the resolution of that problem had not Yasser Arafat reneged on that agreement at the last minute to prove once again that a solution for the refugee problem was not critical in even making let alone keeping peace agreements. 

	With respect to the history of UNRWA and the institutional origins of dealing with the Palestinian refugee situation, I may have had a greater contribution in that area to scholarship, but it was Benny Morris whom I met in the British archives at Kew Gardens who came to the Centre for Refugee Studies for a three month term as a visiting scholar to complete what became his classic book on the origins of the Palestinian refugees who has had by far the greatest impact​[41]​. Further, whereas Benny’s book stimulated a long and bitter debate over the issue and many misinterpretations, I have not noticed that the results of my institutional research nor even Benny’s research on causes had any significant impact on resolving the plight of the Palestinian refugees. This is also true of my research on the historical origins of UNHCR as rooted in the Cold War and state self-interests as much as a new sense of individual rights and universal humanitarian responsibilities.

	Possibly, but only possibly, my historical research on the so-called “right of return” for Palestinian refugees as a serendipitous creation of Count Folke Bernadotte rooted in his own feudal conceptions of “home” may have an impact now that it is about to emerge as a general thesis about all refugees This thesis will be elaborated upon in a new forthcoming book written by myself and Elazar Barkan of Columbia University to argue that refugees who are products of ethnic conflict do NOT go home and have not returned EXCEPT, as in the case of Rwanda, if they return, as the Tutsis exiled in the nineteen sixties did, behind an army with the influence of coercive force​[42]​. However, even if the thesis and its explanation rooted in theories of trust and distrust in the creation of working societies might have an important intellectual influence, I suspect that cosmopolitan moralists will still insist on pushing rights of return even if it means refugees suffer in refugee camps for years even decades in service of an unachievable ideological goal. If the thesis led to resolving refugee problems much quicker, then one might claim that the research had some influence on assisting refugees, but I remain skeptical.

Protracted Refugees in General 

	This raises the question of the effects of my research and that of my collaborators on helping to end the plight of protracted refugees and internally displaced persons whose lives are wasted as they barely survive in the deplorable conditions of refugee camps for years and even decades. My work with Awa Abdi, who was a graduate student at York University, on the refugees in Dadaab refugee camp who lived in semi-arid conditions in the wastelands of northern Kenya on less than minimum rations, pointed out that the pockets of minorities – Ethiopians and Sudanese - in a camps where 95% of the refugees were Somalis, were places of ethnic persecution for those minorities​[43]​. Thus, refugees were subject to persecution in a camp overseen by UNHCR ostensibly to provide a temporary humanitarian respite by an international institution with a mandate to provide protection to those fleeing persecution. Furthermore, most of the Somali refugees in that camp wanted to return home to Somalia but were unable to do so for institutional structural reasons, some very negative, such as the high cost of return compared to the low cost of keeping them in camps. Others remained in camps because of mis-targeted benevolence where refugees stayed in camps to ensure their children were educated, a goal they probably could not have achieved had they returned home. 

	The studies of my Princeton University graduate students of Kakuma camp in northern Kenya that consisted overwhelmingly of Sudanese demonstrated a more general thesis of the institutional and structural conditions behind the maintenance of refugees in camps for years well beyond its use date.​[44]​ This thesis was proven once again by the team I led which undertook research of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal​[45]​, of Karen refugees along the Thai border​[46]​ and Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh​[47]​ who had fled from Myanmar, though resettlement of the Bhutanese and Karen began shortly after we started that research project. That laudable initiative was not influenced by our research but possibly was influenced by the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) which had begun a campaign against refugee warehousing at about the same time as we had initiated our research project​[48]​. In fact, research on the IDPs in Sri Lanka demonstrated the relative impotence of even humanitarian agencies to assist the refugees with solutions as they necessarily must compromise what they can and cannot do if they want to continue to provide minimum assistance for those who are forcibly displaced​[49]​. Perhaps, my research on the IDPs and refugees in Iraq, backed up by more general research on no return will demonstrate why Canada must take a lead in the resettlement of the Chaldeans and Christians as well as Palestinians in Iraq for, unlike the Sunnis and Shias who can return to areas where they are a majority, the Christian minorities of Iraq who still speak the language of Jesus will be unable to return​[50]​. Jordan and Syria, though insufficiently acknowledged for their very generous hospitality in providing a temporary refuge, are highly unlikely to be able or willing to provide permanent resettlement. However, I suspect that a program of resettlement will not be a product of research but of lobbying by humanitarian agencies and Christian and other groups concerned with the plight of Iraqi refugees.
	If I have painted a very pessimistic portrait of the impact of research and its feeble utility when it comes to the obligation of speaking Truth to power, or at least of my relatively ineffectual efforts in that direction, it is well to note that the phrase did not originate with scholars as most of my colleagues contend, but more likely originated in the work and mandate of the Society of Friends in the eighteenth century as they gave Christian witness to their belief and opposition to the reliance on military power in the modern system of nation-states and they pursued efforts to provide humanitarian aid as they pushed forward policies advocating gradually weaning states away from their addiction to and reliance upon coercive force​[51]​. Those efforts continue as I speak at a time when the policies of the most powerful states have moved in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, the Society of Friends or the Quakers as they are best known, continue to address contrarian messages to those who hold power in high places and the broad public who continue to believe in force as a necessity in fighting tyranny and evil.
	Though I was a pacifist in my youth, my studies have not been pushed by a bedrock of moral certainly. Friedrich Nietzsche once wrote that he stood in defence of aesthetics so that our sensibilities would not be destroyed by truth​[52]​, and the Quakers have given witness to their belief that moral norms in which they believe will not be destroyed by truthful revelations about dominant historical trends, I believe I have always tried to protect ethical practices from the danger of their destruction by truth while pursuing truth that will inform ethical practices. Rooted on two feet that often travel in two directions, I have seen as my task the effort to try to align them so that they are trained to march in the same direction. As I have tried to demonstrate, the results have been a relatively clumsy effort rather than an athletic gold winning performance.
Related Fields

	Thus, my refugee and scholarly research has carried me into other areas. On the one hand, some of it led back to issues of settlement and integration such as the research I supervised of a graduate student of the racism endemic to an apartment building on Islington Avenue near Steeles Avenue. This was not the racism of establishment Whites against newcomers who were visible minorities, but the racism among and between different groups of visible minorities – West Indians, immigrants from the Indian subcontinent and Somalis. Those studies of racism were generalized from work I did on the phenomenology of lordship and bondage and manifested itself in the more general thesis on racism of one of my most eminent former students, Cecil Foster​[53]​.
	
	Other work of my own studies worse alternatives than being forcibly displaced. The study I undertook with Astri Suhrke, a Norwegian colleague, on the role of the “bystanders’ in the genocide in Rwanda was perhaps the most important​[54]​. But I have not noticed that those studies have had any impact on what has occurred in Darfur. My work on the necessary conditions for reconciliation continues with my Norwegian partners in Bergen​[55]​, as I continue to demonstrate the difficulty even impossibility of reconciliation in the short run in most cases. My work on early warning with former post-doc students such as Susanne Schmeidl​[56]​ has led to institutionalization of early warning systems in the Horn of Africa (CEWARN)​[57]​ and in West Africa (WARN) as well as initiatives in the African Union, and those initiatives have led to some saving of lives as has been demonstrated​[58]​, but the impact has been on small and localized conflicts while the larger far more destructive violence rages between the Acholi and other Ugandans that cost the life of one of our graduate students at the Centre for Refugee Studies, Andrew Forbes, persistently resists efforts to resolve even outlier conflicts between the Lords Resistance Army and the Ugandan state. Those early warning systems have not yet developed mechanisms that can confront the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, between Khartoum and the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa, between various factions of Somalis, and the inter-ethnic manipulated conflicts in the most stable of states in the Horn of Africa that recently erupted in Kenya. Perhaps we have been more successful in West Africa in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 





	Are there any general lessons that can be drawn from this very selective and partisan review of my own work on whether research is of any help to refugees? Descriptively, my notion and convictions as well as current research on the nature of sovereignty reveal it to be a minority position in the current intellectual war of words. Though I have formidable bedfellows such as Michael Walzer and Hannah Arendt in insisting that protection will only be provided for refugees when they can belong to states that guarantee their rights, and that membership not human rights remains the prior question, in the realm of refugee studies the cosmopolitans dominate the landscape. So although my research may have had little relative effect in benefiting refugees and if I had remained actively engaged I almost surely would have helped them much more, even in the intellectual realm of scholarship, I think it fair to say that my voice has been one that is shouted from the sidelines and most scholarship continues indifferent to those claims.

	My work on governance theory – not on integrity systems and how to make bad regimes better on which my colleagues such as Charles Sampford and Wes Cragg have done such excellent work – but on actual so-called sovereign practices, may eventually effect some changes, particularly my current work on the governance of the international health workforce. For as we will demonstrate, more deaths have been caused by the lack of capacity in and the mal-distribution of the health workforce than from all the genocides, slaughters, civil wars and inter-state wars of the twentieth century on which I have worked. Yet of over 6000 papers presented at the International Studies Association this year in San Francisco, not one focused on the global issue of the health workforce. I have pledged to change that omission next year, but if the panel is accepted, it will be interesting to see if anyone shows up to hear the papers. 

	On the other end of the spectrum, one of my research teams is working on policies on what states can do with persons who they wish to remove because of security concerns (for example, those believed to be connected with global terrorism) because they lack sufficient evidence to convict of any crime but cannot remove because of their commitment not to deport people to countries that practice torture. The results may only bear importance for a very small group of five in Canada​[62]​ – but it is of critical importance to understanding sovereignty and the international system. So too are issues concerning other problems in executing removal orders! There are immigrants – not refugees – whom Canada does not wish to select, but who are in Canada and the government is unable to remove them on the basis of the humanitarian norms that Canada and other western countries uphold that prevent those countries from sending people back to countries where they cannot get treatment for kidney failure because of inadequate facilities for treatment in their home country. Return would be a sentence to death. Many have done exemplary service in promoting the humanitarian case for keeping these people and for insisting that people should not be detained for years on end on the basis of suspicions even of terrorism, for people in a western democracy cannot be interned indefinitely without them being charged.  
 
	In the tension between my humanitarian concerns and my passion to investigate intellectual dilemmas, I have been much more easily seduced by the latter, even when the latter devotion has proven that I have had a lifelong affair with a very fickle and flighty mistress. So I am left to conclude that the pursuit of truth must be carried on independent of compassion even as I am torn between the two and insist that the standard must remain – as I originally described it – where cognitive revelations lead to actual changes in policy and practices. While a commitment to compassion has been far more effective in helping refugees, I have always been more smitten by my love affair with truth than my care for human beings, more concerned even with the willful mindblindness of compassion to truths that can be demonstrated on such basics as numbers and more overarching generalities such that refugees cannot return except by force when they are products of ethnic and religious conflicts. Change requires a partnership with policy makers, but I have avoided moving into the policy making realm as my contemporaries, Ron Atkey, Lloyd Axworthy and Irwin Cotler did.
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